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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the Court err in accepting, approving, and
enforcing the parties1 Stipulation as a settlement agreement
dispositive of all pending issues?

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a divorce action in which Mrs. Brown, the

plaintiff-appellant (hereinafter "appellant") appeals the Order
entered by the Court below, which approved and enforced the
parties' Stipulation and modified their prior Decree of Divorce
in conformity with the terms of the Stipulation.
2.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDING
The parties were divorced on January 7, 1980 (R. at 16)

and shortly thereafter, on February 21, 1980, the Court below
entered its Amended Decree of Divorce (R. at 19). Appellant
subsequently filed her Petition for Modification of Decree of
Divorce on March 1, 1983 (R. at 29), to which Mr. Brown, the
defendant-respondent (hereinafter "respondent"), counterpetitioned.

(R. at 37)

Thereafter extensive discovery was

undertaken and completed.

(R. at 238, 241; T. at 3, 6)

matter was set for trial on August 14, 1984.
Proposals for settlement were exchanged.
250-251; T. at 3, 6, 15-16)

The

(R. at 148)

(R. at 238, 241,

Prior to the trial, on June 5, 1984,

an agreement was reached and the parties and their attorneys
appeared at a proceeding before a court reporter and recorded
their Stipulation, setting forth the terms of their settlement
agreement and disposing of aLl pending issues.
trial date was stricken.

As a result, the

(R. at 150, 238-239; T. at 3-4)
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Respondent thereafter reduced the recorded Stipulation
to writing and sent it to the appellant!s counsel for execution,
(R. at 239; T. at 4)

After some delay and assurances from

appellant's counsel that the written Stipulation would be
executed and returned, appellant's counsel instead filed his
Withdrawal on November 7, 1984,

(R. at 151, 239; T. at 4)

Appellant's new counsel then entered his Appearance and
informally requested further discovery (R. at 155, 240; T. at 5 ) ,
whereupon respondent filed his Motion For Order Approving and
Enforcing Settlement Agreement as stipulated by the parties
before the court reporter on June 5, 1984.
3.

(R. at 160)

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
Upon hearing, and after taking the matter under

advisement, the Court below granted respondent's Motion For Order
Approving and Enforcing Settlement Agreement; accepted and
approved the parties' Stipulation, and entered its Order
modifying the parties' Decree of Divorce in conformity with their
Stipulation (R, at 191),
4.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 21, 1980, the Honorable Christine M.

Durham, then Judge of the District Court in Salt Lake County,
entered an uncontested Amended Decree of Divorce based upon the
Stipulation of the parties.

(R. at 19) This Amended Decree

of Divorce provides in pertinent part that:

3

a.

Appellant is awarded custody of the parties1 three

minor children (R. at 19);
b.

Respondent is awarded visitation rights with the

parties1 minor children, basically consisting of alternating
weekends from Friday evening until Saturday evening, alternating
holidays, and one or two weeks each summer if appellants,
respondents, and the children's schedules can accommodate such.
(R. at 19-20); and
c.

Appellant is awarded $300 per month per child, for

a total of $900 per month as child support*

(R. at 20-21)

The month immediately prior to the time the parties'
Amended Decree of Divorce was entered, the respondent grossed
approximately $7,500 that month in wages.
wages were approximately $81,500.

At years end his gross

(R. at 77-78)

The parties'

youngest child in appellants' custody was not school age (R. at
250; T. at 15) and the appellant relied solely on respondent for
her support.

(R. at 125; T. at 5)

Three years after entry of the parties1 Amended Decree
of Divorce, the appellant filed her Petition For Modification of
Decree of Divorce on March 1, 1983, seeking in pertinent part an
increase in alimony from $900 per month to $1500 per month, an
increase in child support from $300 per month per child to $500
per month per child; respondent's assumption of the children's
orthodontal expenses, and attorney's fees.
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(R. at 29-32)

Respondent counter-petitioned seeking an expansion of his
visitation rights and a termination of his alimony obligation.
(R. at 37-43)
During the course of more than a year, extensive
discovery was conducted and completed by both parties.
238, 241; T. at 3, 6)

(R. at

Upon conclusion of discovery, it was clear

that respondent had, since the time of the parties' Amended
Decree of Divorce, remarried and had another child.

(R. at 75)

Further, his monthly living expenses had increased substantially
(R. at 69-75) yet his gross monthly wage at this time was
approximately $7,150, though with a projected year-end gross wage
of $98,500.

(R. at 76-77)

The appellant on the other hand, who

is still in her thirties, is a college graduate who once
qualified for teaching and has a real estate license, (R. at 250;
T. at 15) yet she had contacted no employment agencies and made
no application with Utah Job Service in the past year (R. at
124-125) and continues to rely on respondent as her support
despite the fact that the parties1 minor children are now school
age (R. at 23, 250; T. at 15) and no other activities would
interfere with her gainful employment.

(R. at 125) Against

these facts the trial date of August 14, 1984 approached.
Respondent had scheduled appellant's deposition for
June 5, 1984, and the parties exchanged proposals for settlement.
(R. at 238, 250-251; T. at 15-16)
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Appellant's counsel proposed a

future termination of alimony and sent a copy of that proposal to
the respondent.

(R. at 250-251; T. at 15-16; Addendum A-l)

Respondent's counsel replied by letter of May 30, 1984, offering
his final proposal for settlement,
Addendum A-5)

(R. at 251; T. at 16;

The day prior to appellant's scheduled deposition

her attorney informed respondent's attorney that the issues were
settled, and proposed that the deposition time be used in recording
the parties' agreement which would thereafter to reduced to written
form.

(R. at 238; T. at 3)

At the time of the scheduled deposition on June 5, 1984,
appellant discussed the agreement with her attorney.
T. at 7)

(R. at 242;

The parties and their attorneys then appeared before a

court reporter, and the comprehensive settlement agreement was
set forth in detail as the parties' Stipulation.

The Stipulation

begins by acknowledging that the parties have reached a
settlement, and immediately thereafter clearly states the
provisions relating to alimony and child support.

(Addendum A-6)

As counsel for the respondent recited the Stipulation, appellant's
counsel interjected, as did the respondent.

The appellant,

however, made no objections, expressed no reservations, and said
nothing during the entire proceeding.
7-8, 9)

(R. at 242-243, 244; T. at

The Stipulation took effect in July, 1984.
Following the proceeding which recorded the parties

Stipulation, counsel for the respondent reduced this agreement
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to a writing which it is acknowledged accurately reflects the
parties1 Stipulation and sent it to appellant's counsel for
signing.

The scheduled trial date was stricken, and starting in

July the respondent met his increased financial obligations to
the appellant under the terms of the Stipulation and appellant
accepted the benefits without reservation.

(R. at 239, 245, 247;

T. at 4, 10, 12) The parties conducted summer visitation based
upon the Stipulation.

(R. at 240; T. at 5)

Appellant expressed

no objection to the terms of the Stipulation.
T. at 5, 16-17)

(R. at 240, 251-252;

Although there was some delay in respondent's

receipt back of the written Stipulation previously sent to
appellant's attorney, respondent's attorney was assured by
appellant's attorney that the written Stipulation would be
executed and returned.

Instead, after over five months of

respondent meeting his increased financial obligations under the
terms of the Stipulation and the loss of a trial date and tax
benefits to the respondent, appellant's attorney filed his
Withdrawal and appellant for the first time expressed to respondent
through inference by her new attorney that she did not consider the
Stipulation to be binding upon her.
10)

(R. at 239-240, 245; T. at 4-5,

Respondent thereafter filed his Motion For Order Approving and

Enforcing Settlement Agreement as stipulated by the parties before
a court reporter on June 5, 1984.

(R. at 160)

Upon hearing by the

Court below, respondent's Motion was granted, the parties'
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Stipulation was accepted and approved by the Court, and the parties1
Decree of Divorce was modified by its Order conforming with the
June 5th Stipulation and providing in pertinent part that:
a.

Appellant's alimony is reduced from $900 per

month to $500 per month commencing with July, 1984, and
continuing for a period of two years;
b.

Respondents child support obligation is increased

from $300 per month to $500 per month for each of the parties'
three children for a total of $1,500 per month;
c.

Respondent's visitation rights with the parties

minor children are detailed and expanded;
d.

Respondent is to pay all past and future

orthodontal expenses of the parties1 minor children; and
e.
of $1,500.

Respondent is to pay appellant's attorney's fees
(R. at 191-198)

Although appellant chose to resist

enforcement of the parties' Stipulation at hearing on
respondent's Motion, she has never moved to vacate her
Stipulation.
SUMMARY OF ARGDMENT
Although appellant is dissatisfied with the rulings of
the Court below, that Court was in an advantageous position to
receive and weigh the evidence presented, and to become
acquainted with the parties' problems and the totality of the
circumstances relating to the issues.
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Despite the subjective

dissatisfaction of one party to a divorce action, unless there is
a clear showing of misapplication of the law or abuse of
discretion, then the carefully considered ruling of the trial
court should not be disturbed.

Eastman v. Eastman, 558 P.2d 514

(Utah 1976).
In the present case, appellant has failed to show a
misapplication of the law or clear abuse of discretion by the
Court below.

Although the Klein case, supra, holds that a party

is entitled to relief from a stipulation upon his timely
repudiation if there is any jurisdiction for relief in law or
equity, those cases cited by appellant in her brief where relief
from a stipulation was granted are clearly distinguishable from
the present case.

Stipulations of settlement are generally

recognized as contracts requiring a higher degree of
justification for relief than that necessary to avoid an ordinary
stipulation.

Kershaw v. Pierce Cattle Co., 393 P.2d 31 (Idaho

1964); United Factors v. T.C. Associates Inc., 21 Utah 2d 351,
445 P.2d 766, (1968).

The issue of whether appellant understood

and agreed to the terms of the stipulation is one of fact,
clearly within the Court's discretion to determine. Klein,
supra; Baird v. Baird, 6 Wash. App. 587, 494 P.2d 1387 (1972).
Although appellant asserts she did not understand or agree to the
stipulation, the trial court was presented with firm evidence to
the contrary, the weight of which supports its findings that all
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issues were considered and the agreement was made with the
consent of all parties.
It is also within the discretion of the trial
court to determine whether appellants application for relief
from the stipulation was timely made.

United Factors, supra;

Johnson v. People's Finance and Thrift Co., 2 Utah 2d 246, 272
P.2d 171 (1954).

Here, appellant has never made formal

application for relief from her stipulation, though after several
months she did oppose enforcement.

The evidence clearly shows that

any objection she made was more than five months from the date of
the stipulation and after both parties had conducted themselves in
accordance with the stipulation to appellantfs benefit and
respondents substantial financial detriment.

Certainly there

was no clear abuse of discretion by the trial court in estopping
appellant from denying the agreement in as much as her objection
was untimely in view of the circumstances.
Nor do the total facts and circumstances in this case
clearly indicate that the resulting Order modifying the parties1
divorce decree, as based upon the stipulation, is inequitable.
In divorce actions, where the trial court may exercise considerable
discretion in adjusting the parties' rights and obligations, a
stipulation is not necessarily binding on the court and it may
consider not only the stipulation but the totality of facts and
circumstances of the case in fashioning an equitable decree.
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Klein, supra.

Here, where respondent's income has increased

together with his financial obligations, but where the evidence
shows appellant clearly has the education, skills, and ability
to contribute towards her support, the parties' stipulation and
the resulting Court Order is not inequitable.
Appellant has not met her burden of showing clear abuse
of discretion or misapplication of the law to such a degree that
the Order is manifestly unfair and inequitable.

The Order of the

lower Court should be affirmed in its entirety.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE CONSIDERED AWARDS AND ORDERS OF THE TRIAL

COURT ARE PRESUMED PROPER AND SHOULD NOT BE MODIFIED ABSENT A
CLEAR SHOWING BY APPELLANT THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION, OR WAS MISTAKEN AS TO THE APPLICABLE LAW.
It is clear from appellant's brief that she is
extremely dissatisfied with Judge Sawaya's Order approving and
enforcing the parties' Stipulation, and modifying the parties'
Decree of Divorce in conformity with that Stipulation.

The fact

that one of the parties to a divorce proceeding is dissatisfied
with the rulings of the trial court, however, is neither
indicative of the propriety and merits of those rulings nor
unusual in the course of the inherently emotional and
psychologically traumatic process of divorce and subsequent
proceedings.
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Clearly a stipulation between the parties to a divorce
action does not divest the trial court of his authority to
fashion a just and equitable decree nor abrogate his duty to do
so.

That court retains the authority, despite a stipulation of

the parties, to consider the total facts and circumstances of the
case in adjusting the rights and obligations of the parties to
effect a fair outcome of the proceedings.

As noted in Klein v.

Klein, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975):
It is the established rule that a stipulation
pertaining to matters of divorce, custody, and
property rights therein, though advisory upon
the court and would usually be followed unless
the court thought it unfair or unreasonable, is
not necessarily binding on the court anyway.
It is only a recommendation to be adhered to
if the court believed it to be fair and
reasonable...there is no reason that the trial
court cannot consider what was proposed by the
parties as a stipulation, and what was said by
their counsel about it, as part of the total
facts and circumstances upon which to fashion
what in his judgment is a just and equitable
decree. 544 P.2d at 476 (footnote citation
omitted).
Once such judgment of the trial court is exercised, and as this
Court has held on innumerable occasions, the ruling of the trial
judge in divorce actions of an equitable nature is favored with a
presumption of propriety and accuracy.

It is only in those few

instances in which the appellant can clearly demonstrate a
manifest abuse of discretion or misapplication of law such that
the orders of the trial court are inequitable in relation to the
circumstances of the case that the considered judgment of the
12

trial judge will be disturbed.

Such a position is logically

grounded upon the advantaged position of the trial court, which
has received evidence presented on the issues and become
acquainted with the parties1 problems and the totality of
circumstances relating to the issues. As observed in Eastman v.
Eastman, 558 P.2d 514 (Utah 1976):
We have many times stated that even though
divorce cases are equitable, on which this
Court may review the evidence, due to the
advantaged position of the trial court, we
give considerable deference to his findings
and do not disturb them unless the evidence
clearly preponderates to the contrary, or
he has abused his discretion or misapplied
principles of law. 558 P.2d at 516
(footnote citation omitted.)
It is therefore incumbent upon appellant to demonstrate
some clear abuse of discretion or misapplication of law before
this Court will act to revise any aspect of the judgment entered
below.
In view of the considerable discretion accorded to the
trial judge and this Court's requirement that a clear abuse of
discretion or misapplication of law be demonstrated as a
condition precedent to any substitution of the trial judge's
ruling, the burden is upon the party dissatisfied with the trial
court's decision to demonstrate such error.

One of the many

cases so holding is English v. English, 565 P. 2d 409 (Utah
1977), in which the Court concisely summarized this rule:
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The trial court, in a divorce action, has
considerable latitude of discretion in
adjusting financial and property interests,
A party appealing therefrom has the burden
to prove there was a misunderstanding or
misapplication of law resulting in substantial
and prejudicial error; or that the evidence
clearly preponderates against the findings;
or that such a serious inequity has resulted
as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion,
565 P.2d at 410 (footnote citation omitted,)
Essentially identical statements of this principle are found in
numerous other Utah cases.

See Barker v. Barker, 551 P.2d 1263

(Utah 1976); Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utah 1975); and
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974),

Similarly, in

the divorce decree modification case of Christensen v.
Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1981), this Court again
summarized the applicable standard of review:
On review this Court will accord
substantial deference to the judgment of
the trial court due to its advantaged
position and will not disturb the action
of that court unless the evidence clearly
preponderates to the contrary, or the
trial court abused its discretion or
misapplied principles of law... 628 P.2d
at 1299 (footnote citation omitted.)
Under the standard of review traditionally applied by
this Court, the judgment of the Court below is presumed valid and
will not be disturbed unless appellant has demonstrated that the
trial judge has misapplied the relevant law to such a degree that
the Order is manifestly unfair and inequitable or has so clearly
abused his discretion as to result in substantial prejudice.
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POINT II. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MEET HER BORDEN OF
DEMONSTRATING MISAPPLICATION OF LAW OR CLEAR ABOSE OF DISCRETION;
THEREFORE THE JODGMENT BELOW SHOOLD BE AFFIRMED IN ITS ENTIRETY.
Although appellant's brief makes clear her subjective
dissatisfaction with the judgment entered by Judge Sawaya, she
fails to show a misapplication of law such that would make the
judgment of the Court below manifestly unfair and inequitable or
an abuse of discretion resulting in substantial prejudice.
As this Court has held, if there is any justification
in law or equity for avoiding or repudiating a stipulation, and
he timely does so, he is entitled to be relieved from it, otherwise
not.

Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975)

The justification

necessary for relief upon timely repudiation of a stipulation
which disposes of all issues in settlement of pending litigation
as here, however, must clearly be of a high degree.

Stipulations

for settlement of litigation are regarded with favor by the
courts and are generally accorded recognition as a contract.
Kershaw v. Pierce Cattle Co., 393 P.2d 31 (Idaho 1964).

As this

Court noted in United Factors v. T.C. Associates, Inc., 21 Utah
2d 351, 445 P.2d 766 (1968):
In the case of a stipulation for settlement,
the general rule is that it is to be
regarded as removed from the sphere of
ordinary stipulations, particularly procedural
ones, which the court is free to set aside or
not, in its broad discretion and for the sake
of convenience alone, and although there is
some authority that it may be set aside upon
15

a proper showing if no material change in the
position of the parties has occurred, the rule
is usually stated to require, for granting
relief, a showing equivalent to that
necessary to set aside a contract in equity,
(445 P.2d at 768, footnote citation omitted.)
This court found the settlement stipulation there to be a binding
contract and denied relief when there was a unilateral mistake of
fact upon which the stipulation was based.

So also did the court

in the divorce case of Baird v. Baird, 6 Wash. App. 587, 494 P.2d
1387, (1972) which held that a judgment based upon the parties1
stipulation for settlement will not be upset absent a showing of
fraud, mistake, misunderstanding, or lack of jurisdiction.
Those cases granting a party relief from a stipulation,
and as cited by appellant in her brief in support of her position
that she has good cause and should be accorded such relief, are
clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case.

In

Call v. Marler, 403 P.2d 588 (Idaho 1965) there was no
stipulation for settlement.

The court there held that the

parties1 subsequent stipulation at trial contradicted their prior
stipulation and to that extent abrogated it. The court in First of
Denver Mortgage Investors v. Zundel, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979)
disregarded a stipulation involving a point of law requiring
judicial determination to enforce the rights of parties to the
action who were not parties to the stipulation.

Nor did the

stipulation there purport to settle all issues.

In Harsh

Building Company v. Bialac, 529 P.2d 1185 (Ariz. 1975) the court
16

affirmed relief from a stipulation settling all issues but only
upon a finding of special circumstances changing the conditions
upon which the stipulation was based and a determination that the
stipulation was entered into under duress of directed verdict
sufficient to negate contractual intent.

Where the stipulation

was contrary to the cityfs statutory duty and was construed by
the city contrary to the intent of the parties, the court in
Runyan v. City of Neosho Rapids, 585 P.2d 1069 (Kan. 1978) upheld
relief from the stipulation to the extent that it did not conform
with the parties1 intent and the understanding of the lower
court.

In Thompson v. Turner, 558 P.2d 1071 (Idaho 1977) the

stipulation related to procedure only, and the court there
affirmed relief in the interest of judicial economy.
The Stipulation of the parties in the present case is a
complete settlement of all issues.

It is not one involving

contradictory agreements on certain issues, points of law
necessary for judicial determination, changed circumstances or
mere procedure.

No fraud or lack of jurisdiction is alleged.

Here, the appellant claims she was "ambushed," that she never
came close to settlement and did not understand the Stipulation
nor agree with it. The record discloses, however, that appellant
was privy to settlement negotiations between counsel.

Her then

attorney sent her a copy of her proposal for settlement offering
a termination of alimony in three years and a child support
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increase to a sum closely approximating the terms of the
Stipulation.

(Addendum A-lj R. at 250-251; T. at 15-16)

Respondent's attorney countered with his final proposal for
settlement accepting most of appellant's proposal but seeking
some concessions relating to alimony, child support, and summer
visitation.

(Addendum A-5; R. at 251; T. at 16). It was

uncontroverted at hearing that copies of these letters were in
appellant's possession prior to the Stipulation.

Appellant

admits discussing proposals and counter-proposals for settlement
with her attorney prior to the Stipulation (R. at 241; T. at 6)
She most probably knew that she risked a termination of her
alimony if the matter went to trial, in view of discovery
indicating her level of education, job skills, and lack of
involvement in any activities apart from the care of her schoolage children.

(R. at 124-125, 250; T. at 15) Clearly she was a

party to the negotiations for settlement.

If, as appellant

contends, she had no knowledge that her deposition would be used
to record the parties' Stipulation and that she did not
understand or agree to the Stipulation, the evidence is clearly
contrary.

Prior to recording the Stipulation she discussed the

terms with her then attorney and was told that the purpose of the
meeting was to agree to those terms on the record. Her attorney
strongly advised settlement on those terms and expressed his
assessment and opinion that she would not fare better on the

18

issues at trial. Although appellant may have been disappointed
with her attorney's assessment, she chose to follow his advise
and proceeded before a court reporter to have the agreement
recorded in her presence and with her attorney as the parties1
Stipulation.

(R. at 179-180, 242; T. at 7; Addendum A-2)

Clearly at this point appellant understood the parties' agreement.
Though she may have had reservations, she acquiesced upon her
attorney's advise.

She chose to proceed.

Certainly there was not

"duress" here as in Harsh, supra, where the

parties had no

viable option but to reach a settlement agreement on better terms
than the foregone conclusion of a directed verdict.

Nor has there

been a change of conditions upon which appellant's Stipulation was
based or a question as to appellant's intent as in Runyon, supra.
Appellant here knew the terms of the Stipulation, and the purpose
of the meeting.

She proceeded with her attorney to record what

she knew to be the parties' settlement agreement.

(R. at 180,

242-243; T. at 7,8; Addendum A-2)
At the time the parties' settlement agreement was
recorded before a court reporter as their Stipulation, all
parties and their attorneys were present.

Everyone present,

except the appellant, interjected as the comprehensive
Stipulation for settlement was recorded.
T. at 3, 8, 9)

(R. at 238, 243, 244;

It should have been apparent to appellant that

she, also, could have interjected if she had concerns or
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disagreement.

Appellant, however, expressed no reservations,

made no objections, nor repudiated any portion of the Stipulation
at that time.

She said nothing.

(R. at 244; T. at 9) The

recorded Stipulation as recited in appellants presence by the
parties1 attorneys begins by acknowledging that the parties have
reached a settlement, and immediately thereafter states the
provisions relating to alimony and child support in no uncertain
terms.

(Addendum A-8)

understanding.

It is easily subject to clear

As this Court has recognized, the issue as to

whether a party agreed to and should be bound by a stipulation is
one of fact for the trial court to determine.

Klein v. Klein,

544 P. 2d 472 (Utah 1975); accord, Baird, supra. Here, there is
substantial evidence that appellant negotiated, understood and
consented to the parties' Stipulation.

The record clearly

supports the Minute Entry of the court below, that Mthe
settlement agreement was fully negotiated between the parties and
counsel; that all issues were considered and an agreement was
struck and entered on the record and that all parties and their
counsel consented to the terms."

(R. at 190; Addendum A-24)

The evidence firmly supports the findings of the lower court that
the parties appeared with their attorneys before a court reporter
for the purpose of setting forth their settlement agreement, and
that all issues were considered, an agreement was struck and
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entered on the record, and the parties and their counsel consented
to the terms. (R. at 200; Addendum A-26)
Upon facts clearly analagous to those in the present
case, this Court has upheld the parties1 stipulation where a
party who evidenced his consent to it later sought to repudiate
it.

In Klein, supra, where the appellant claimed he didn't

understand the proceedings involving the stipulation and that he
didnft agree to the terms but assumed that negotiations would
continue and that he would have an opportunity to examine the
stipulation once it was reduced to writing, this Court affirmed
the decision of the court below which bound that party to the
terms of the stipulation.

Likewise, where the record indicates

something less than a clear understanding and uneauivocal
agreement to a stipulation, the court upheld a stipulation
entered into by the parties where one party later repudiates the
agreement.

Bean v. Carlos, 21 Utah 2d 309, 445 P.2d 144 (1968);

Baird, supra.

Simply stated, appellant's grounds for seeking

relief from the parties1 Stipulation are not supported by the law
or the evidence, and do not approach the degree of justification
necessary for relief at law or in equity.

She claims no fraud.

The weight of the evidence does not support mistake or her claim
of misunderstanding or duress sufficient for relief from her
agreement.
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Although appellant argues that she not only has
justification for relief from her stipulation but was timely
within her power in repudiating the parties1 Stipulation, thereby
meeting the Klein test, supra, the weight of evidence on the
issue does not bear out her assertion.

Prior to the time the

parties and their attorneys set forth their Stipulation before
the court reporter, the terms of the agreement were discussed
between appellant and her attorney.

She did not refuse to enter

into the agreement then, but instead chose to proceed in having
the agreement recorded as her Stipulation.

(R. at 179-180, 242;

T. at 7; Addendum A-21) At the time the Stipulation was
recorded in her presence, she could have objected, expressed any
mental reservation she may have had, or recanted; appellant failed
to do so.

(R. at 244; T. at 9) Nor did she do so immediately

after the parties1 settlement agreement was recorded when any
repudiation could have been made apparent to all parties in her
presence.

Further, she made no objection the following day when

she was away from the pressure of the deposition hearing.

She

made no objection when respondent began paying, and she accepted
the increased support payments under the Stipulation in July as
respondent started exercising his expanded summer visitation.
Instead, appellant waited over five months from the date the
parties1 settlement agreement was recorded as their Stipulation,
and three to four months from the time the written Stipulation was
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presented, before expressing any objection to the respondent.
(R. at 240; T. at 5) Even then appellant made no formal request
to the court for relief, but merely informed respondent by
inference that she opposed enforcement of the Stipulation.
(Addendum A-42) Though appellant claims there were delays in
her receipt of the written Stipulation and in meeting with her
attorney after the Stipulation was recorded on June 5, 1984,
(R. at 243-245; T. at 8-10) she could have expressed her
objections by letter or telephone call to her attorney.
uncontroverted that she did not attempt to do so.

It is

(R. at 251;

T. at 16) For over five months from the time the parties recorded
their Stipulation, and for three to four months from the time the
writing based upon that Stipulation was presented, no objection
was heard from appellant.
In the meantime, and as appellant must have known, the
August trial date for litigation of any disagreement between the
parties—if in fact appellant had a disagreement — was stricken
and passed.

The respondent continued to meet his increased

financial obligations under the provisions of the parties1
Stipulation, and the appellant recognized the Stipulation and
accepted those benefits without expressed objection or
reservation.

(R. at 239, 245, 247; T. at 4, 10, 12)

Summer

visitation with the parties1 minor chidren was conducted pursuant
to the parties1 Stipulation.

(R. at 240; Tl at 5) Still, no
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objection to the Stipulation or its provisions was expressed by
appellant.

At the time of hearing on respondent's Motion for

Approval and Enforcement of the parties1 Stipulation, the
respondent had met his increased financial burden under that
agreement of over $2,000 with the loss of a trial date and
certain tax benefits related to alimony payments.

(R. at 239-

240, 245; T. at 4-5, 10)
Clearly appellant's objection to the parties'
Stipulation, made informally over five months from the date of
the parties' agreement, is not timely under the Klein test, or
the facts present in this case.

Noting that application for

relief from a stipulation must be timely made, this Court accords
discretion to the trial court in determining whether a
stipulation should be vacated.

United Factors, supra; Johnson

v. Peoples Finance and Thrift Co., 2 Utah 2d 246, 272 P.2d 171,
(1954).

There, this court affirmed denial of applications for

relief brough upon motions to vacate a stipulation as within the
court's discretion.

It was certainly within the discretion of

the court below to enforce the parties' Stipulation under the
circumstances of this case.

Though appellant asserts that

respondent did not reasonably rely on the parties' Stipulation
where the written stipulation was not returned, the respondent
could not be expected to know appellant's unexpressed repudiation
and mental reservations concerning the parties' Stipulation in
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view of appellant's conduct, which from every outward appearance
evidenced her continuing agreement with the parties1 Stipulation
and her intent to be bound by it.
The Order of the court below enforcing the terms of the
parties1 Stipulation was an appropriate exercise of that court's
discretion under the facts and circumstances existing in this case.
As this Court has noted on more than one occassion:
...when the parties failed to perform in
accordance with their stipulations, the
court is not powerless to require them
to abide by their agreement. It would
indeed be a serious relection on our
system of jurisprudence if parties could
stipulate an agreement of settlement but
refuse with impunity from performing.
Courts are not impotent when one or more
parties to a stipulation becomes recalcitrant.
People's Finance and Thrift Co., supra at 172; Bean v.
Carlos, 21 Utah 2d 309, 145 P.2d 144 at 146 (1968).
In view of the total circumstances of this case, the
approval and enforcement of the parties' stipulation which
substantially increased total support and alimony to appellant,
and obligated respondent to additionally meet past and future
orthodontal expenses for the children appears fair.

The

resulting Orders fashioned by the lower court upon the
Stipulation and modifying the parties' Amended Decree of
Divorce appears just and equitable under the total circumstances
of this case.
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CONCLDSION
In divorce cases and in subsequent proceedings for
modification this Court has invariably held that the decision of
the trial judge is to be respected unless it clearly appears that
he has abused his discretion or manifestly misapplied relevant
law to the substantial prejudice of the appealing party.

The

standard of review appropriately grants deference to the
advantaged position of the trial judge who has received evidence
presented on the issues and become acquainted with the parties,
their problems, and the totality of the circumstances relating to
the issues.
Although appellant is dissatisfied with the rulings of
the trial court, her subjective dissatisfaction is neither an
appropriate nor sufficient ground for modification or reversal of
the trial court's ruling.

The court below appropriately applied

the relevant law on the issues and did not agree that appellant
was justified in relief from the Stipulation.

Nowhere does

appellant isolate an instance in which Judge SawayaTs judgment
substantially and prejudically errs against her or his findings
are not firmly supported by substantial evidence.

It was clearly

with the trial court's discretion to determine whether or not the
appellant understood and agreed to the Stipulation.

The evidence

clearly supports the findings that all issues were considered by
the parties and an agreement was struck. In view of the
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negotiations between the parties, the discussion of the terms of
the Stipulation between appellant and her attorney and the
purpose of the meeting prior to the time the Stipulation was
recorded on June 5, 1984, and appellant's presence with her
attorney at the time the Stipulation was recorded, there was
certainly no clear abuse of discretion by the trial court in
finding that the Stipulation was agreed upon and consented to.
The evidence firmly supports the court's finding that
appellant made no objection to the Stipulation for over five
months, during which time she reaped the benefits of the
Stipulation to respondent's substantial detriment, and that her
conduct estopped her from denying the agreement. Appellant
expressed no objection to the stipulation from June 5, 1984 until
her new attorney contacted respondent by letter over five months
later.

She accepted the increased financial benefits from the

respondent without objection and allowed summer visitation
pursuant to the Stipulation.

By all outward appearances she

treated the Stipulation as binding.

The trial court

appropriately exercised its discretion in declining to accept
appellant's objection to the Stipulation as being timely made.
Stipulations in settlement of divorce and modification
actions are advisory on the trial court, anyway, and the court
below could consider the total facts and circumstances of the
case to fashion a just decree.

The Order of the lower court,
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though based primarily on the Stipulation of the parties and the
circumstances relating to it, is not inequitable in light of the
total facts of the case indicating not only an increase in
respondent's income but a dramatic increase in his financial
responsibilities, and an educational level at which the appellant,
with her specialized skills and freedom from committments, could
obtain employment to contribute to her support. The approval
and enforcement of the Stipulation increasing respondent's total
support to appellant and further obligating him on all past and
future orthodontial expenses is fair and not a clear abuse of
the court's discretion.
The Order entered by Judge Sawaya reflects careful and
judicious consideration of the parties, their problems, and their
interests.

In the absence of clear abuse of discretion or

manifest injustice, as in this case, the rulings of the trial
court should not be disturbed.

Therefore, Judge Sawaya's

decision should be affirmed in its entirety.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of September, 1985.

DART, ADAMSON & PARKEN

B

y

„

B. L. DAftt

By
JOHN D. SHEAFFER, JR.
Attorneys for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

day of

,

1985 I hand-delivered four copies of the forgoing Brief to attorney
for appellant, David A. McPhie, at his office located at 147 North
Second West, Salt Lake City, Utah
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B. L. DART
State Bar #818
DART, PARKEN & PROCTOR
Attorneys at Law
430 Ten Broadway Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re:

Brown v. Brown
Civil No. D-79-3802

Dear Bert:
/
I

In connection with your letter dated April 3, 198 4, I have
had the opportunity of reviewing the same at length with Mrs.
Brown. It should be noted at the outset that the general tenor
of your letter is certainly reasonable. It should further be
noted that Mrs. Brown has contacted the Career Counseling Service
at the University of Utah and has an appointment within the next
several weeks. Evidently, Mrs. Brown will attempt to procure
employment in the communications, advertising and/or T.V./radio
industries. She is in the process of speaking with K.S.L.
television and is hopeful that something beneficial will occur
shortly. In attempting to procure employment in these areas,
Mrs. Brown has gone through a rather difficult decision-making
effort. She has furthermore been informed that entry level
salaries in these areas are very low and that it will more than
likely be necessary that a great deal of re-schooling take place.
For the above reasons, Mrs. Brown would desire that alimony
continue at the same level it currently is for a period of
thirty-six (36) months. At that time, alimony should terminate.
In the interim, Mrs. Brown would request that child support be
increased from $300.00 per child to $550.00 per child for a total
of $1,650.00, based upon Dr. Brown's substantial increase in
salary since the entry of the Decree of Divorce. This position
in the long run is beneficial for both of the parties in that it
decreases Dr. Brownfs long-term obligations ^nd gives Mrs. Brown
the incentive necessary to re-train herself.
A-l
r-/>"

B.L. DART
May 10, 1984
Page Two

In connection with the above alimony and support award, Mrs.
Brown would request that Dr. Brown provide life insurance for the
benefit of the minor children until the children reach the age of
21, marry or become self supporting.
Your suggestion with regard to the health and dental
insurance is obviously acceptable, with the additional provision
that Dr. Brown be responsible for the outstanding obligation
presently due and owing to Dr. Gary Stevens and that Mrs. Brown
have the obligation of providing Dr. Brown the medical, dental
and orthodontal bills within a reasonable period of time not to
exceed thirty (30) days.
As to visitation, Dr. Brown's requests in paragraphs 2 and 4
are acceptable. Mrs. Brown informs me that these paragraphs
embody the parties1 general working agreement. With regard to
the other paragraphs, Mrs. Brown would comment as follows:
a.
Paragraph 1 - It should be noted at the outset
that Mrs. Brown does not plan events just to annoy Dr.
Brown. Sometimes, it is rather difficult to give Dr. Brown
notification of activities in advance. A recent example is
that of Darren's baseball game. Evidently, Darren's coach
contacted Mrs. Brown while the child was visiting with Dr.
Brown and informed her that a baseball game had been
rescheduled for the next day. Obviously, Mrs. Brown will
attempt to keep Dr. Brown informed of the children's
activities and will attempt not to schedule activities for
Dr. Brown's visitation time. She furthermore agrees to use
her best efforts to do so, but rejects the requirement that
Dr. Brown be notified one to two weeks in advance of the
activities.
b.
Paragraph 3 - Mrs. Brown would propose that the
parties split the Christmas holiday with Dr. Brown to have
the children on Christmas Eve day until 9:00 p.m.. The
remaining Christmas visitation would take place as agreed
upon by the parties.

A-2

B.L. DAFT
May 10, l-:->t
Page Thre-/

'V and wait for the children.
.
^Paragraph 6 - Mrs. Brown informs this office that
with rcHKtrd t o s u m m e r visitation she has been more than
flexible*. Evidently, Dr. Prownf for the last several
summers, has h a d t h e children for the summer holidays plus
in ex-ooc*^ af t w o w e e ] c s # Mrs. Brown would desire that such
schedule continue.
*•
Paragraph 7 - As stated above, Mrs. Brown would
have nn w ro blems in using her best efforts to provide Er.
Brow:- vi-^ schedules of the children's performances and
othex- « x ~ ra-curricular activities.
Obviovuaiv
is acceptable.

your proposal with regard to attorney's fees
*

Mrs. Br 0 w n would request several additional clarifications
of the or?.q{M, ^ D e c r e e #
she would desire that Dr. Brown inform
her in ad\-a!KV when and where he is taking the children when he
leaves th^ ^\; y . in addition, Mrs. Brown would appreciate being
allowed r-^ar.o.r.able telephonic access to the children anc Dr.
Brown whe^ t*^ children are visiting with Dr. Brown and M s wife.
Evidently, t ? ^ r e have been some problems in the past in this
regard.
So tNat Airs. Brown will be able to plan on receipt of her
support arvl a - imony sums on a regular and consistent bas.is, Mrs.
Brown wouV, ct*sire" that the proposed Order set forth that support
and alimcr*v v. r%vments be made on the first day of each ar-* every
month.
A-3
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The only remaining issue is the question of the children's
accounts at Jordan Credit Union, Valley Bank/Olympus Branch and
Draper Bank. Mrs. Brown would request that her name be put on
these accounts, and that she and Dr. Brown be co-trustees with
rights of survivorship for the children.
If the above is agreeable, then I will be more than glad to
prepare the necessary Stipulation.
I await your reply.
Very t r i j l y y o u r s ,
GUSTIW, JIDAMS, I^STING & LIAPIS

PAUL H. LIAPIS '
PHL:ib
Enclosures
cc:
C a r o l Brown
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May 3 0 , 1984
Paul H. L i a p l s
48 Post Office Place
Third Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
Re:

Brown v. Brown

Dear Paul:
I have now reviewed your letter of May 10 with Dr«
Brown, and I would like to propose some alternatives that may
bring us to the point we can settle this action.
Your proposal that your client's alimony continue for
three years at its current level is not acceptable, Your client
has already had four years to reestablish herself, and your
proposal would take Dr. Brown's current support and alimony
obligation from $1800 to $2400 a month. Dr. Brown would be
willing to settle with her on an arrangement of support at $500 a
month per child with the alimony to continue for a two year
period at the rate of $500 a month. This would provide your
client with a $2,000 a month payment at the present time, which
is $200 in excess of what she is currently receiving and within
the next two years, she should be fully able to obtain what other
training she might need for employment and have located a job to
meet her needs.
Dr. Brown is willing to continue maintaining life
insurance on his life for the next two years while the alimony
obligation is in place with his former wife as beneficiary. He
is also willing to continue maintaining life insurance on the
minor children of the parties so long as he has an obligation for
support. With respect to the proposal for the payment of dental
and orthodontic expenses, Dr. Brown was not intending to include
expenses which have been incurred to this time, and he does not
intend to include the payment of medical expenses which are not
covered by the health and accident insurance carried by him on
the children. The health and accident insurance has a $100
deductible and so the medical expense to your client should not
be too substantial. Dr. Brown does inform me that if we can get
all the issues in this case resolved, then as an incentive to
reach settlement, he would pick up the obligation which is
currently owed to Dr. Gary Stevens which I understand is
approximately $1,000.

4)15*
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Paul H. Liapis
Page Two
May 30, 1984

We still have difficulties on your proposal on
visitation. Your letter does not respond to paragraph 2 of our
letter, but since these holidays were provided for in the decree
of divorce, I assume you do not disagree with that paragraph.
With respect to paragraph 3, your response is not satisfactory as
Dr. Brown should have an opportunity to have the children for a
week commencing on the 26th of December, which would give your
client Christmas Day and effectively the week before Christmas.
I am confident that if this matter were presented to a court,
that request would be granted. Your letter does not respond to
paragraph 4 of our letter, and I would assume that request is
also acceptable to you.
Finally, your proposal concerning the summer visitation
is not acceptable. The children have now reached an age where a
one month period is reasonable, and again, a period of time which
I am confident the Court would allow to Dr. Brown. The two week
period is simply not a sufficient time for Dr. Brown to share
with his children during the summer months.
proposals
strike an
necessity
scheduled

I would appreciate it if you would review the above
with your client, and then let me know whether we can
agreement to avoid a contest. It will also avoid the
of taking your client's deposition which is currently
for the 5th of June at 10:00 a.m.
I will look forward to receiving your reply.
Yours very truly,

B. L. Dart
BLD/jmo
cc: Bryant Brown
A-6
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BE IT REMEMBERED that on che 5th day of June,

L

1984, the Plaintiff and Defendant met with counsel at che

2

offices of Dart, Adamson, Parker. & Proceor, 310 Souch Main,

3

Suite 1330, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake Councy, Scace of Utah,

i

Is^d

agreed to the following Stip ulacion:

5
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MR. PAUL K. LIA^IS. ESQ.
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S T I P U L A T I O N

1

MR. DART:

2

For the benefit of the record that

3 we're staring, we have, been discussing with both clients
4

and both attorneys various settlement proposals that have

5

gone back and forth over the past month and a half, two and

6

a half,months, excuse me, and we now have reached a point

7 where we have a settlement understanding that we're all desiroi
8 of having put down in writing.
9
10

And to that end we're going

to read it into the record, and then we'll obtain a transcript
so that any confusion that might exist in the future can

11 be clarified by that transcript and then there will be a
12 formal written stipulation and a formal order drafted based
13 upon the agreement we reached today.

The stipulation would be that in connection

14

15 with the currently pending petition for modification, that
16

that petition will be resolved by amendments and agreements

17

as follows:

18
19

Number 1, the alimony award currently existing
shall be modified to provide that Mrs. Brown, commencing

20 with July of 1984, will have her alimony payment reduced
21

from the current level of $900 to the sum of $500, and that

22

that payment shall continue for a period of two years, at

23 which time it will terminate.
24
25

And that this payment of alimony

shall be payable on or before the fifth day of each month.
It's been expressed that there are difficulties
HARMON, SHINDURLING, BROWN & TRACKER
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTERS
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH
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1

in the house payment being paid, and as an accommodation,

2

if the doctor can make payment before the 5th, he is of an

3 awareness that there is a desire that that be done.
I think it also ought to be expressed that the

4

5 modification of alimony is made on the contemplation that
6 by two years from now Mrs. Brown will have been able to have
7 sought and obtained employment sufficient to allow a termination
8 of the alimony award.
The support will be modified commencing with

9

10 the month of July to be increased from the current amount
11 of $300 per child to the sum of $500 per child for each of
12 the three children.

Payments of support are due and payable

13 on or before the 5th, and the payment of support shall continue
14 to age 21, on the same terms that existed in the decree of
15

divorce as to the conditions of which payment would continue.

16 I think those were that the children be, unless they became
17 married or emancipated or not continue with their school.
DR. BROWN:

18

It's eighteen unless they serve

19

a mission or go to college, aiid then it continues to age

20

twenty-one.

21
22

MR. DART:

Whatever the terms of the decree

are, they will provide, except with the modification that

23 any child not living at home will have the payment of support
24 paid directly to the child after age eighteen.
25

MR, LIAP1S:

With the proviso that t^he Plaintiff

hAuMwis. SttlNDuRLIN'G, bRO*VN & THACKER
CERTlFlEO SHORTHANO REPORTERS
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH
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1

will have the right for enforcement of collection if they are

2

not paid directly to the child.

3

MR. DART:

The doctor also will agree to pay for

4

orthodont ia treatment which has been provided to this time

5

by Dr. Gary Stephens, the outstanding bill at this time, and

6

I think it also should be expressed that he will have to possit

7

make some arrangements to possibly make some installments,

8

but I don 1t know what it is.

9

That he, further, will be responsible so long

10

as there is an obligation for support, to pay the children's

11

orthodont ia and dentist expenses.

12

to continue to maintain the children on his health and accident

13

insurance , which has a $100 deductible.

14

or covere d by insurance would be the responsibility of Mrs.

15

Brown for her health and treatment.

He shall further be responsi

Any expenses not descr

16

The doctor also will continue in force his curre

17

existing life insurance that has the children as beneficiaries,

18

and that obligation will continue so long as there's an obligat

19

for support.

20

existing life insurance on Mrs. Brown so long as he has an

21

obligation for alimony.

22

on this, it's a $50,000, and also the children's is a $50,000

23

policy.

24
25

He will also continue in force his currently-

It's my understanding that the policy

MR. LIAPIS:

Further, the doctor will pay against

attorney1 s fees that have been incurred by Mrs. Brown in
•

HARMON. SHINDURLING, BROWN & THACKER
CERTIFIED SMORTHANO REPORTERS
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH
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-

1

this proceeding.

2

When?

The amount of these fees to the sum of $3,500.

MR. DART:

3

Within thirty days of billing.

And

4

I think that covers all of the financial items that we've discuss-

5

If it doesn't, let me know.
The agreement relating to continuation of health

6
7

insurance should have, as part of it, che understanding that

8

Mrs. Brown would have the obligation o f providing to Dr. Brown

9

the medical and dental and orthodontal bills within a reasonable

10

time not to exceed thirty days of when they are received.

11

and I discussed this, assuming there is an item that has not

12

been discussed and not mentioned here, and so it is an item

13

of oversight, that either side would have the right to get

14

an agreement on that or have the Court solve it.

15

MR, LIAPIS:

16

MR. DART:

Paul

That's correct.

The next item that has a financial

17

component is that the original decree of divorce provided that

18

the Jordan Credit Union, Valley Bank, Olympus Branch, and Draper

19

Bank accounts that were accounts for the children be transferred

20

to Mrs. Brown.

21

it's his recall that he had provided yo u with signature cards

22

sufficient to do that and thought that that was an accomplished

23

fact.

24

of course, do that.

25

Dr. Brown thought that he had done that, and

If it is not an accomplished fact, he's willing to,

The stipulation will be that Mrs. Brown will
HARMON. SHINDURLING. BROWN & THACKER
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1 provide to Dr. Brown the account numbers on each of the invol
2

accounts and that Dr. Brown will take whatever steps are nece

3

to have his name removed from the accounts so that Mrs, Brown

4 name can be placed on the accounts.
The next area is the area of Dr. Brown's right

5
6

of visitation, and the understanding and agreement relating

7

to that visitation is that he will have reasonable rights of

8 visitation with the minor children, and that his rights of
9 visitation, in addition to anything we describe, will include
10 anything that the parties can mutually agree upon,
I put that in so that you're both aware that

11

12 you're not locked into this if you both agree to something
13

different.

But beyond that, his rights of visitation would

14 be to have, A, the children with him on alternate weekends
15 with that visitation right being altered from its current ful
16 weekend period to provide from Friday evening at 6:00 p.m.
17

to Saturday evening at 6:00 p.m.

18

Two, the agreement is that Mrs. Brown will not

19

schedule any activites for the children which will in any way

20

conflict with Dr. Brown's visitation time without first consu

21 with Dr. Brown, and in the event that the parties are not abl<
22

to agree on such an activity being scheduled for Dr. Brown's

23 visitation time, then either party would have the right to
24
25

bring the matter before the Court for a determination.
Upon scheduling activities occurring at Dr.
HARMON. SHINDURLING, BROWN & THACKER
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1

Brown's visitation time that he agrees that he will do whatever

2

is necessary to see that the children participate in that

3

activity.

4

reasonable advance notice of any of the activities that the

5

children are involved in, and that there be at least some

6

advance notice, as much as possible, of any of the activities

7

the children are participating in in which they are performing

e

in a competitive activity or in which they are participating

9

in front of an audience that includes adults or other parents.

10

And another element of that, Mrs, Brown will provide

Dr. Brown would have the right to have the children

11

on alternate holidays, and I think that's scheduled in the

12

decree of divorce.

And when those holidays are Monday holidays

13 which come on the weekend he has visitation, he'd have the
14

full weekend for three days, including Sunday.

So he'll

15

have visitation on those weekends would be from Friday at

16

6:00 until Monday at 6:00 p.m.

17

He would have the right to have the children

18

each New Year and during the Christmas holiday commencing

19

Christmas Day at 1:00 o'clock, that that visitation will

20

continue through the remainder of the Christmas vacation

21

unless there are less than five days of Christmas vacation

22

before Christmas, and in that event, then the time will have

23

to be worked out so that she has at least five days during

24

the Christmas break.

25

That in the summer he will have the right to
HARMON. SHINDURLING. BROWN & THACKER
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have them with him for a month, and this year that will be
the month of July.

That while he is out of town he will-

provide an itinerary, and a reciprocal is that when Mr s.
Brown takes the children out of town, she will also provide
an itinerary for Dr. Brown.
That during the month of July while he is in
town, Mrs. Brown will have the right to contact the children
by phone and they will have the right to contact her by phone,
and she 1 11 be entitled to have one visit with them during
that time.
The visitation each summer will be agreed upon
with Dr. Brown to notify you at least sixty days in advance
of when he would like to have the month, and at: the same
time you and he work out an agreement as to one day during
that period that you would have the right to have them.

And

the same understanding on the right to converse with them
while they' re in town by telephone would exist and also the
need to provide you with an itinerary would also existThe understanding is that the parties will consul
at least ninety days before the beginning of the summer of
their anticipated schedules to make sure that there are no
conflicts and to try and flex around potential conflicts
that might exist.

If there is a conflict, either p<arty would

have the right to ask the Court to resolve it if it gets
to that po:Lnt.
HARMON. SHINDURLING, BROWN & THACKER
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And further, Dr. Blown would represent that

as soon as he knows when he might be going, even if it r s
five or six months in advance, he'll provide you with that
notice.

Also, if the children are going to be offered an

opp ortunity to register for summer activity that requires
| an early registration, you'll notify the doctor so he can

let you know whether that might conflict with his plans.
And again, the hope is there will be mutual accommodation.
The next item is the doctor will have the right

to visit with the children frequently at times other than

tho se outlined provided that the visitation does not conflict
with important activities in which the children are involved.
The next, Mrs. Brown will allow either Dr. Brown

or his present wife to pick up and return the children, but
in the event that it's the current Mrs. Brown picking them

UP> that she will honk for the children and drive away.

If

the children do not come or she's notified when the children
will be there within five minutes, then she'll have the right

to go to the door and get that information.
We'll provide, relative to the life insurance

on the children, that the three children will remain as
beneficiaries on that policy so long as there's an obligation

for support of any child.

As soon as there's no obligation

for support, then the obligation to maintain the policy will
terminate.
HARMON, SHINDURLING. BROWN & THACKER*
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That so long as the policy is in force, if any
of the children are no longer supported, Mrs, Brc.m would
have the right to notify Dr. Brown of her desire to elect
that the policy have the names of the non-supported child
removed from the policy so it enters the benefit of only
the supported children.
The doctor will provide evidence that both of
his life insurance policies are currently in force.

II
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1 I

C E R T I F I C A T E

2 STATE OF UTAH

§
§
§

3 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss.

4
5

I, Cecilee Gruendell, do hereby certify that

6 I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in
7 the State of Utah; that as such Reporter T attended the hearing
8 of the foregoing matter, and thereat reported in stenotype
9 all the statements and proceedings had therein; that thereafter
10 I caused to be transcribed my said stenographic notes into
11 typewriting, and the foregoing pages numbered from 2 to 10,
12 inclusive, constitute a full, true, and correct report of
13 the same.
14

Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 15th day

15 of June, 1984.
16
17
18
19

Cecilee Gruendell
C.S.R. License No. 167

20
21 My commission expires:
22 March 10, 1986.
23
24

* *

*

25
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Court

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
; CAROL ANN BARKER BROWN,
•j

Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF CAROL BROWN

ii
.i V S .

Civil No. D79-3S02

I-BRYANT JEROME BROWN,
I'

Defendant.

i-

STATE OF UTAH
)
I'
: ss.
|COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Comes now Carol Brown, and being first duly sworn
», oath, deposes and states:

1
1.
lj

That I am the Carol Brown who is the plain

in this case.
2.

That I approached my first attorney in this

i
i

i

1

approximately eighteen months ago concerning a petition to m

A-19

i;
j_
; the decree of divorce.
4

3.

That he, after

hearing my story about my former

Phusband's increased income, and after

reviewing my decree of

! divorce, assured me that an increase in alimony and child support
| was justified.
ji

4.

That a l l through the period he represented me,

approximately

e i g h t e e n months,

a period

in which we were

! preparing for t r i a l , my former attorney expressed
S that

T would win major

confidence

increases in both child support and

I,alimony.
J1

5.

That in l a t e April of 1984, my former

attorney

s

i notified me that I would need to come to a deposition to be hel<
!

I June 5, 1984, at 10:00 a.nu
j

6.

That on the day of

the d e p o s i t i o n , my forme

."attorney advised me for the f i r s t time that:
a.

I wasn't going to get more alimony, but rathe

that I would loose i t .
b.

That my increases in child support would not offs

the decrease in alimony.
;

c.

That T needed to agree to my former husband

requests for increased visitation, which I considered outragec
because the court would grant i t anyway.

11

i
I

d. That we were about to go on the record in I

Dart's office, and agree to all of the above, because he 1

i told Mr. Dart I would agree, and it was pointless to go to coi
j'anyway.
jj

7. That I was shocked, dismayed, dissapointed f

•'confused.

It appeared to me that my attorney had changed

(position of eighteen months, overnight.

He tried to expl<

I to me why his assessment of my case had changed

suddenly.

. was unsatisfied by his explanation, but the deposition was
h
i;hand, and he insisted that I stipulate and agree,
i

!
8. That I next went into the room and listened
1
H M r . Dart, my former husband, and M r . Liapis talk abou
!settlement agreement, and a court reporter took it all do1

ii

|» I d o n ' t r e c a l l whether or not I s a i d anything a t t h a t t i m e ,
h I c e r t a i n t l y d i d n ' t agree.
jj
1

i

9.

That later a written stipulation was sent to

L i a p i s by Mr. Dart, which he asked me t o s i g n .
10.

That

I refused

to sign

t h e agreement <

tj s t i p u l a t i o n document b e c a u s e i t ' s p r o v i s i o n s were unfair in
;; o p i n i o n .
j!
1 1 . Mr. Liapis insisted that I had to sign, an
i

!!

I dispute arose which led me to seek new counsel.

1'c

12.

That, but for the exchange of a few documents,

j'most of which have been previously requested by me, this case
is ready for trial.
13.

That I may be wrong, Mr. Liapis may be rightr

{

'but after having gone this far and spent as much money as I have,

J}X want my day in court.

!i
DATED this Xf

day of February, 1985.

-7,

/

is •

Carol Brown
S u b s c r i b e d and sworn t o b e f o r e me, a Notary P u b l i c ,
t h i s ? 5 ^ d a y of February, 1985.

Notary Public
.
Residing a t : ( S/RT LAve. Cdui/fH
My Commission Expires:

i 31
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a Lruc and correct copy
of the foregoing Affidavit of Carol Brown, postage prepaid,
to B.L. Dart, 310 South Main, Suite 1330, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84101, on this 25th day of February, 1985.

Deborah Marr,

A-2 3

cretary
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J a m e s S . Sawaya
JUDGI

DATE: A p r i l 1 6 , 1985

REPORTER

BAILIFF

The matter of Defendant's Motion for Order Appovina and
Enforcing Settlement Agreement came on regularly for hearing
on Apirl 15, 198 5 with appearances as above indicated«

The matter

was fully presented, argued and submitted and the decision thereof
taken under advisement by the Court,

The Court, having now fully

reviewed and considered the matter makes its ruling and decision
thereon as follows:
It would appear that in spite of Plaintiff's protestations, the
settlement agreement was fully negotiated between the parties and
counsel; that all issues were considered and an agreement v/as struck
and entered on the record and that all parties and counsel consented
to the terms•

Equity dictates that the sanctity of that aareemtn

should be presered and should Prevail.

COPIES TO

co^SELrr^nQ^ry^?

Defendant's Motion is aranted

,^ jc^cs'

••'
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B. L. DART (818)
Attorney for Defendant
310 South Main
Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 521-6383
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
CAROL ANN BARKER BROWN,

:

Plaintiff,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.

:

BRYANT JEROME BROWN,

:

Civil No. D79-3802

Defendant.

:

Judge Sawaya

oooOooo
Defendant's Motion for an Order enforcing the
provisions of an agreement entered into between the parties
on the 5th of June, 1984, came on regularly for hearing on
Monday, the 15th day of April, 1985, at the hour of 2:00 o'clock
p.m.

Defendant appearing in person and by his attorney B. L.

Dart, and plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney
David A. McPhie, and the Court having heard the arguments and
proffers of respective attorneys and having reviewed the file
and being fully advised, hereby makes the following:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Following the filing of plaintiff's Petition for

Modification and defendant's Counter Petition, there was
extensive discovery carried out between the parties following
which the parties engaged in extensive negotiation through their
respective attorneys.
2.

On the 5th day of June, 1984, the parties appeared

at a proceeding before a court reporter for the purpose of
setting forth the terms of a settlement agreement which had been
reached between the parties, and with both parties in attendance
with their attorneys the terms of the agreement were read into
the record with input provided by attorneys for both of the
parties.

At that time all issues were considered and an

agreement was struck and entered on the record and all the
parties and counsels consented to the terms either affirmatively
or impliedly by not objecting to any of the terms of the
Stipulation.
3.

For a period from the 5th of June, 1984, until the

30th of November, 1984, plaintiff made no objection to the
Stipulation which had been reached on the record and had been
reduced to a written Stipulation and presented to her for her
signature.

During this period of time she received the

additional financial benefits under the terms of the Stipulation
which included an increase in the amounts paid by defendant to

2
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plaintiff of $200 per month.
4.

Plaintiff by her conduct is estopped from denying

this agreement and defendant has relied to his detriment on
plaintiff's acceptance of the benefits and equity dictates that
the sanctity of that agreement should be preserved and should
prevail.
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court now
makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant's Motion for an Order appproving and

enforcing the settlement agreement is hereby granted.
2.

The Stipulation of the parties is accepted by the

Court and the Decree of Divorce heretofore entered in this action
may be modified in accordance with that Stipulation as more fully
hereinafter set forth.
3.

The Decree of Divorce is modified to provide that

plaintiff's award of alimony shall be reduced from the amount of
$900 a month to the amount of $500 a month commencing with the
month of July, 1984, and continuing thereafter for a period of
two years or until plaintiff remarries whichever occurs first.
Upon the happening of either event, alimony will terminate.
Defendant's payment of alimony shall be due on or before the 5th
day of each month.

3
ory5
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So long as defendant has an obligation for alimony,
he is ordered to maintain plaintiff as a named insured on a
currently existing life insurance policy in the face amount of
$50,000.

Defendant is ordered to provide plaintiff with evidence

that this life insurance is currently in force.
4.

The Decree of Divorce is modified to provide that

defendant's obligation to plaintiff for support shall be
increased from a sum of $300 per month to a sum of S500 per month
per child for each of the three minor children of the parties
commencing with the month of July, 1984. Payments of support are
due on or before the 5th day of each month and defendants
obligation for support shall continue to age 21 for any child who
shall elect to serve a mission for the LDS Church, or shall
elect to attend a college or university.

For any such child over

the age of 18 not living at home, the payment of support shall be
paid by defendant directly to said child.

If payment of support

is not paid to said child by defendant, plaintiff shall retain
the right for enforcement of collection.
As an additional obligation of support, defendant
is ordered to pay for orthodontia treatment which has been
provided to this time by Dr. Gary Stephens and to pay for any
orthodontia and dentist expenses for any child so long as there
is an obligation for the payment of support for said child.
Defendant is further ordered to continue to maintain the children
4
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on his health and accident insurance which has a $100 per child
deductible.

Plaintiff is ordered to provide to defendant all

medical, dental and orthodontia bills within a reasonable amount
of time not to exceed 30 days of when they are received..

Any

medical expenses not described or covered by insurance will be
the responsibility of plaintiff.
As a further obligation for support, defendant is
ordered to maintain in force his currently existing life
insurance with the children named thereon as beneficiaries so
long as defendant has an obligation for support.
insurance policy has a $50,000 death benefit.

This life

So long as the

life insurance policy is in force, if defendants obligation to
pay support for any child terminates, plaintiff will have the
right to notify defendant of her desire to elect that the policy
have the name or names of the non-supported child or children
removed from the policy so that it retains only the supported
children as named beneficiaries.

Unless such an election is made

by plaintiff, defendant shall retain all children as named
beneficiaries on the life insurance policy until his obligation
to support the last child is terminated.
5.

Plaintiff is ordered to provide to defendant the

account numbers of the Jordan Credit Union, Valley Bank/Olympus
Branch, and Draper Bank accounts that are the accounts for the
children awarded in the Decree of Divorce to be transferred to
5
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plaintiff*

Upon receipt of these account numbers, defendant is

ordered to take whatever steps are necessary to have his name
removed from the accounts so that plaintiffs name can be placed
upon the accounts,
6.

The Decree of Divorce should be modified to

provide, in addition to what other rights of visitation the
parties may in the future mutually agree upon, the following:
a.

Defendant shall have the right to have the

children with him on alternate weekends from Friday evening at
6:00 p.m. to Saturday evening at 6:00 p.m0
b.

Plaintiff is ordered not to schedule any

activities for the children which will in any way conflict with
defendant's visitation time without first consulting with
defendant and in the event the parties are not able to agree on
such an activity being scheduled for defendant's visitation time,
then either party will have the right to bring the matter before
the Court for determination.

In the event activities are

scheduled as agreed upon or determined by the Court during
defendant's visitation time, defendant is ordered to do whatever
is necessary to see the children participate in that activity.
c.

Plaintiff is ordered to provide defendant with

a reasonable advance notice of any of the activities in which the
children are involved and that there will be as much notice as
possible of any of the activities of the children in which they
6

204
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are performing in a competitive activity or in which they are
participating or performing in front of an audience that includes
other adults or parents.
d.

Except for Christmas, defendant shall have

the right to have the children on alternate holidays, and when
those holidays are Monday holidays which come on the weekend
defendant has visitation, he shall have the full weekend for
three days including Monday, and on those weekends visitation
shall be from Friday at 6:00 p.m. until Monday at 6:00 p.m.
e.

Each Christmas holiday, defendant shall have

the right to have the children commencing on Christmas Day at
1:00 p.m. for the remainder of the Christmas vacation until the
commencement of school, unless there are less than five days of
Christmas vacation before Christmas, in which event the parties
agree time will be worked out so that pLaintiff has the children
with her at least five days during the Christmas break.
f.

Defendant will have the right to have the

children with him each summer for a month.

During summer visitati

while the children are in town, plaintiff will have the right to
contact the children by telephone and they will have the right to
contact her by telephone, and plaintiff shall be entitled to
have one visit with them during that time.
The visitation each summer will be agreed upon
between the parties.

Commencing in 1986 defendant shall notify
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plaintiff at least 60 days in advance of when he would like to have
the month of visitation, and at the same time, the parties will reach
an agreement as to the one day during the month of summer visitation
that plaintiff will have the right to visit.
The parties are ordered to consult with each
other at least 90 days before the beginning of the summer of
their anticipated schedules to be sure there are no conflicts and
to try and resolve potential conflicts that might exist. If
there is a conflict as to when defendant's summer visitation
should occur, either party will have the right to ask the Court
to resolve the conflict if they are not able to do so.
If the children are offered an opportunity to
register for a summer activity that requires an early
registration, plaintiff is ordered to notify defendant so that he
can let plaintiff know whether this might conflict with his plans
in the hope of avoiding a conflict.
g.

Defendant will have the right to visit with

the children frequently at times other than those outlined
provided the visitation does not conflict with important
activities in which the children are involved.
h.

Either defendant or his present wife shall

have the right to pick up and return the children.

In the event

defendant's current wife is picking up the children, she will
honk for the children in the driveway.
8
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If the children do not

203

visitation and will be taking the children out of town* defendan
is ordered to provide plaintiff an itinerary so that she will
know where the children are.

Plaintiff is ordered whenever she

takes the children out of town, to provide defendant with an
itinerary so that he will know where the children are.
7.

Defendant is ordered to pay the sum of $1,500

toward plaintiff's attorney's fees which shall be paid by
defendant within 30 days of billing by plaintiff's attorney.
DATED this /

day of

2>?&^y,

1985.

BY T

ATTEST
H. DIXON HJNDLEY
Clork

Dis#fri6t Judge

f*B$L?»<5 CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of April, 1985,
I mailed a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusic
of Law to:
David A. McPhie
Attorney for Plaintiff
147 North 200 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84103

r~7.
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B. L. DART (818)
Attorney for Defendant
310 South Main
Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 521-6383
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
CAROL ANN BARKER BROWN,

:

Plaintiff,

:

ORDER

v.

:

BRYANT JEROME BROWN,

:

Civil No. D79-3802

Defendant.

:

Judge Sawaya

oooOooo
Defendant's Motion for an Order enforcing the
provisions of an agreement entered into between the parties
on the 5th of June, 1984, came on regularly for hearing on
Monday, the 15th day of April, 1985, at the hour of 2:00 o'clock
p.m.

Defendant appearing in person and by his attorney B. L.

Dart, and plaintiff appearing in person and by her attorney
David A. McPhie, and the Court having heard the arguments and
proffers of respective attorneys and having reviewed the file
and having made and entered it's Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, now therefore,

1S3
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Defendant's Motion for an Order appproving and

enforcing the settlement agreement is hereby granted.
2.

The Stipulation of the parties is accepted by the

Court and the Decree of Divorce heretofore entered in this action
is hereby stipulated in accordance with that Stipulation as more
fully hereinafter set forth.
3.

The Decree of Divorce is modified to provide that

plaintiff's award of alimony shall be reduced from the amount of
$900 a month to the amount of $500 a month commencing with the
month of July, 1984, and continuing thereafter for a period of
two years or until plaintiff remarries whichever occurs first.
Upon the happening of either event, alimony will terminate.
Defendant's payment of alimony shall be due on or before the 5th
day of each month.
So long as defendant has an obligation for alimony,
he is ordered to maintain plaintiff as a named insured on a
currently existing life insurance policy in the face amount of
$50,000.

Defendant is ordered to provide plaintiff with evidence

that this life insurance is currently in force.
4.

The Decree of Divorce is modified to provide that

defendant's obligation to plaintiff for support shall be
increased from a sum of $300 per month to a sum of $500 per month
per child for each of the three minor children of ttfie parties

2
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commencing with the month of July, 1984.

Payments of support are

due on or before the 5th day of each month and defendant's
obligation for support shall continue to age 21 for any child who
shall elect to serve a mission for the LDS Church, or shall
elect to attend a college or university.

For any such child

over

the age of 18 not living at home, the payment of support shall be
paid by defendant directly to said child.

If payment of support

is not paid to said child by defendant, plaintiff shall retain
the right for enforcement of collection.
As an additional obligation of support, defendant
is ordered to pay for orthodontia treatment which has been
provided to this time by Dr. Gary Stephens and to pay for any
orthodontia and dentist expenses for any child so long as there
is an obligation for the payment of support for said child.
Defendant is further ordered to continue to maintain the children
on his health and accident insurance which has a $100 per child
deductible.

Plaintiff is ordered to provide to defendant all

medical, dental and orthodontia bills within a reasonable amount
of time not to exceed 30 days of when they are received.

Any

medical expenses not described or covered by insurance will be
the responsibility of plaintiff.
As a further obligation for support, defendant is
ordered to maintain in force his currently existing life

3
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insurance with the children named thereon as beneficiaries so
long as defendant has an obligation for support*
insurance policy has a $50,000 death benefit.

This life

So long as the

life insurance policy is in force, if defendant's obligation to
pay support for any child terminates, plaintiff will have the
right to notify defendant of her desire to elect that the policy
have the name or names of the non-supported child or children
removed from the policy so that it retains only the supported
children as named beneficiaries.

Unless such an election is made

by plaintiff, defendant shall retain all children as named
beneficiaries on the life insurance policy until his obligation
to support the last child is terminated.
5.

Plaintiff is ordered to provide to defendant the

account numbers of the Jordan Credit Union, Valley Bank/Olympus
Branch, and Draper Bank accounts that are the accounts for the
children awarded in the Decree of Divorce to be transferred to
plaintiff.

Upon receipt of these account numbers, defendant is

ordered to take whatever steps are necessary to have his name
removed from the accounts so that plaintiff's name can be placed
upon the accounts.
6.

The Decree of Divorce is hereby modified to

provide, in addition to what other rights of visitation the
parties may in the future mutually agree upon, the following:

4
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a.

Defendant shall have the right to have the

children with him on alternate weekends from Friday evening at
6:00 p.m. to Saturday evening at 6:00 p.m.
b.

Plaintiff is ordered not to schedule any

activities for the children which will in any way conflict with
defendant's visitation time without first consulting with
defendant and in the event the parties are not able to agree on
such an activity being scheduled for defendant's visitation time,
then either party will have the right to bring the matter before
the Court for determination.

In the event activities are

scheduled as agreed upon or determined by the Court during
defendant's visitation time, defendant is ordered to do whatever
is necessary to see the children participate in that activity.
c.

Plaintiff is ordered to provide defendant with

a reasonable advance notice of any of the activities in which the
children are involved and that there will be as much notice as
possible of any of the activities of the children in which they
are performing in a competitive activity or in which they are
participating or performing in front of an audience that includes
other adults or parents.
d.

Except for Christmas, defendant shall have

the right to have the children on alternate holidays, and when
those holidays are Monday holidays which come on the weekend
defendant has visitation, he shall have the full weekend for
5
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three days including Monday, and on those weekends visitation
shall be from Friday at 6:00 p.m. until Monday at 6:00 p,m.
e.

Each Christmas holiday, defendant shall have

the right to have the children commencing on Christmas Day at
1:00 p.m. for the remainder of the Christmas vacation until the
commencement of school, unless there are less than five days of
Christmas vacation before Christmas, in which event the parties
agree time will be worked out so that plaintiff has the children
with her at least five days during the Christmas break.
f.

Defendant will have the right to have the

children with him each summer for a month.

During summer visitati

while the children are in town, plaintiff will have the right to
contact the children by telephone and they will have the right to
contact her by telephone, and plaintiff shall be entitled to
have one visit with them during that time.
The visitation each summer will be agreed upon
between the parties.

Commencing in 1986 defendant shall notify

plaintiff at least 60 days in advance of when he would like to hav
the month of visitation, and at the same time, the parties will re
an agreement as to the one day during the month of summer visitati
that plaintiff will have the right to visit.
The parties are ordered to consult with each
other at least 90 days before the beginning of the summer of

6
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their anticipated schedules to be sure there are no conflicts and
to try and resolve potential conflicts that might exist.

If

there is a conflict as to when defendant's summer visitation
should occur, either party will have the right to ask the Court
to resolve the conflict if they are not able to do so.
If the children are offered an opportunity to
register for a summer activity that requires an early
registration, plaintiff is ordered to notify defendant so that he
can let plaintiff know whether this might conflict with his plans
in the hope of avoiding a conflict.
g.

Defendant will have the right to visit with

the children frequently at times other than those outlined
provided the visitation does not conflict with important
activities in which the children are involved.
h.

Either defendant or his present wife shall

have the right to pick up and return the children.

In the event

defendant's current wife is picking up the children, she will
honk for the children in the driveway.

If the children do not

come or she is not notified when the children will be there, then
after waiting five minutes, she will have the right to go to the
door to get that information.
i.

At any time defendant is exercising

visitation and will be taking the children out of town, defendant
is ordered to provide plaintiff an itinerary so that she will
7
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know where the children are. Plaintiff is ordered whenever she
takes the children out of town, to provide defendant with an
itinerary so that he will know where the children are.
7.

Defendant is ordered to pay the sum of $15500

toward plaintiff's attorney's fees which shall be paid by
defendant within 30 days of billing by plaintiff's attorney.
DATED this /

~ day of Jp^t^/^,

1985.

BY THE COURT:

ATTEST
H. DIXON HINDLEY
Clerk
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I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t on t h e 30th day of A p r i l , 1985,
I mailed a copy of t h e foregoing Order t o :
David A. McPhie
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f
147 North 200 West
S a l t Lake C i t y , (JT 84103
i .-
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AFFLECK & MCPHIE
ATTORNEYS & COUNSELORS
AT LAW
DAVID AFFLECK McPHIE
of counsel

147 North 200 West
Salt Lake City, Utah ftfJOJ

GORDON BURT AFFLECK

(301} 531-5333

November 30, 1984

B e r t L. Dart
10 Broadway B l d g . #430
S a l t Lake C i t y , OT 84101
Re:

Brown v s . B r o w n - P e t i t i o n
Modify C i v i l No. D79-3802

to

Dear B e r t :

Mrs. Brown has contacted me, and retained me for purposes
of representing her in this matter. She has recieved your Notice
to Appoint Counsel, and you 1 11 find enclosed with this letter
a copy of my Entry of Appearance.
I have been informed that you're anxious to set a hearing,
at which time the deposition taken on June 5th will be argued
by you to be a binding stipulation. Please send me your motion
and notice of hearing thereon, and we will gladly appear.
I have noticed in going over some of the documents supplied
by Mr. Liapis that we do not have Dr. Brown's 1983 tax return
which was requested by Mr. Liapis prior to withdrawing. Please
send me copies of that tax return at your earliest convenience.
I can see that a substantial amount of discovery has already
been done in this case, and I will not attempt to do any new
discovery that I don't feel is absolutely necessary. I know
that your client must be anxious to resolve this matter now,
I know mine is. If I discover an area in which I think further
discovery is necessary, I hope to be able to contact you
informally and obtain the information without formal discovery

DEC -41934
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Bert Dart
Page Two
November 30f 1984
procedures. In this way we can shorten the time it takes to
get a trial setting in this matter.
Very truly yours,
AFFLECK & McPHIE

r&i
David A. McPhie
DAM:ke
cc:

Carol Brown
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

2

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3

* * * * * *

4
5

!

CAROL ANN BARKER BROWN,

6

rp

Plaintiff,
vs.

7

Case No. D 79-3802

8

BRYANT JEROME BROWN,

9

Defendant.

10
11
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
12
A P P E A R A N C E S

13
14

DAVID A. McPHIE, Attorney at Law, Affleck and McPhie,
147 North Second West, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
15
appearing on behalf of the plaintiff.

16

BERT L. DART, Attorney at Law, 310 South Main Street, #1330,
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17
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18
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20
Proceedings before the Honorable
Judqe James S. Sawaya
r
>'< April 15, 1985

21
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22
23
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24
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CATHY GALLEGOS
Official Court Reporter
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East 400 South
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1

BE IT REMEMBERED that on this the 15th day of

2

April, 19 85, the above-entitled and numbered cause came on

3

for hearing before said Honorable Court, Honorable James S.

4

Sawaya, Judge presiding, in Salt Lake City, Utah, County of

5

Salt Lake, whereupon the following proceedings were had,

6

to wit:

7
8
9

THE COURT:

Back to number one, Carol Ann Barker

Brown versus Bryant Jerome Brown, defendant's motion for

10 order approving and enforcing a settlement agreement.
11

Mr. Dart, you appear for the defendant?

12

MR. DART:

This is the defendant's motion.

I am

13

representing the defendant and making the motion.

14

Court had an opportunity to read the motion and affidavit

15

in support thereof?

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. DART:

18

THE COURT:

Has the

I have to confess I haven't.
I will lay out the facts very quickly.
David McPhie appears for the

19 plaintiff, and do you want this reported, counsel?
20

MR. DART:

21

MR. McPHIE:

22
23

I don't think a record is necessary.
It may be necessary to have it

reported.
MR. DART:

Your Honor, the facts are that Mr. and

24

Mrs. Brown were formerly married to each other and were

25

divorced under the terms of the decree of divorce, which
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1

gave to Mrs. Brown custody of three children, provided her

2

support, alimony and visitation rights-

3

'83, over two years ago, Paul Liapis representing her,

4

filed a modification asking for an increase in alimony and

5

child support.

6

petition asking for an elimination of alimony and for

7

modification of visitation rights.

8

quarter's time frame, we engaged in substantial discovery

9

in the form of interrogatories, interrogatory answers.

And in February of

On behalf of Mr. Brown, I filed a counter-

Through a year and

I

10 had noticed the deposition of the plaintiff on the 5th of
11

June and Paul Liapis had filed a request for trial setting.

12 We were dealing against I think an August 12 trial date last
13 summer.

Mr. Liapis and I exchanged letters on that

14 settlement.
15 forth.

There were several letters that came back and

On the day before the deposition, which was set for

16 June 5th, Paul called me and said, "We are settled.

Why

17 don't we utilize the deposition time to make an agreement.
18 That agreement will then be put into a written form to
19 conform with an order."

On the 5th of June the court

20 reporter, all parties being present, related that we were
21

there to set down the agreement that we had reached and did

22 so.

The agreement effectively put a terminus point on

23 alimony.

However, it also reduced alimony, however,

24

increased support.

Instead of paying eighteen hundred

25

dollars a month, nine hundred dollars alimony and nine

A-46

<C

'*KJ

1

hundred dollars support, the doctor's obligation, defendant's

2

obligation would be increased to a two thousand dollar

3

figure, two hundred dollars a month increase by stepping

4

up child support five hundred for a total of fifteen

5

hundred in the form of support, five hundred for alimony-

6

There is also a comprehensive agreement with

7

regards to visitation, what circumstances, holidays,

I

8

prepared a stipulation based upon that transcript.

9

no question what the stipulation accurately reflected the

There's

10

agreement of the parties.

11

had some problems in September I talked to him about>

12

stipulation was not signed.

13

He sent a letter to his client at that time.

14

time in July it took effect.

15

increased payments of two hundred dollars a month, now,

16

ten months paid of two hundred more a month, a total of

17

two thousand dollars more than he's paid above what the

18

original order was based upon the stipulation, which amounts

19

have been received by the plaintiff without objection.

20

I sent it to Paul Liapis.

We
The

He said he would get it signed.
In the mean-

He started making the

In addition, the trial date for August was

21 I stricken.

I think the Court would find a letter from myself

22 | indicating the case had been settled.

In November, I wrote

23 I to Paul again saying, "I need a stipulation so we can close
24 I this file out."
25

a withdrawal.

Next thing I received from Paul Liapis was

Then the next thing I received was
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1

communication from Mr. McPhie indicating that he was

2

representing the plaintiff in this action and he wanted to

3

continue with discovery, and I inferred from that he did

4

not at that t i m e — t h e plaintiff did not at that time accept

5

the stipulation.

6

down and agreed, three or four months from the date that a

7

written stipulation had been presented, with no objection

8

being made, no indication that the stipulation wasn't

9

acceptable, with summer visitation based upon the stipula-

We were five months from the day we sat

10

tion and with the payments, as I say, having been made by

11

Mr. Brown having the effect of the two thousand dollar

12

increase in the amount paid over what he was ordered to

13

under the original order, but also a reduction in the amount

14

that constituted alimony.

15

been paying three hundred dollars a month less alimony that

16

he cannot take as a deduction for his taxes.

17

tall of it is the agreement is n o t — d o e s not claim to be

18

unconscionable, does not claim to be contrary to what was

19

discussed and presented in the presence of the plaintiff,

20

There f s only the claim that she doesn't want to at this

21

time.

22

accepting the benefits of it, should be basis for estoppel.

23

She should be bound by it.

So for this past ten months, he's

The short and

Her conduct, sitting on it the last ten months,

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. McPHIE:

The Court should enter an order.

Mr. McPhie.
Thank you.

Mr. Dart's representations

5
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of the facts essentially are accurate.

As Ear as his

2

recitation of facts w e n t , this was commenced a couple years

3

ago.

4

formerly represent Mrs. Brown.

5

in the summer of

6

were in the spring of '84 negotiations for settlement,

7

offers being sent back and forth*

8

for Mrs. Brown scheduled by Mr. Dart and I have no reason

9

to disbelieve Mr. Dart's assertion that Mr. Liapis called

10

him prior to the day the deposition was set for, which was

11

June 5 of

12

settlement and that Mr. Dart expected that when Mr. Liapis

13

and his client came to that deposition, they would be

14

stipulating.

15

Brown would t e s t i f y — s h e has an affidavit in the file to

16

the effect that although they were discussing settlement

17

offers being made by Mr. Dart and they were responding to

18

them with counteroffers and they were going back and forth,

19

she was always being assured by Mr. Liapis that the things

20

that she had asked for in her original petition in the way

21

of increases in support were justified.

22

for her retaining him at the outset and that was her

23

position throughout, including the spring of •84 when they

24

were discussing the possible settlements that were being

25

discussed back and forth.

There has been extensive discovery,

f

Mr, Liapis did

There was a trial date set

'84, I believe.

And prior to that, there

There was a deposition

8 4 , indicating that he believed there was a

That's where the facts diverge, however.

Mrs,

This was the basis

6
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Her further testimony would be lhat on the actual

2

day of the deposition, June 5th, '84, at his office, being

3

Mr. Dart's office, Mrs. Brown learned for the first time

4

that her former counsel essentially no longer believed that

5

she would come out as he had led her to believe throughout

6

the entire period, that he not only had received the

7

settlement offers from Mr. Dart but that he believed that

8

she should accept them.

9

disconcerting item to her is it was that day that she first

10

learned or came to understand that he not only was reciting

11

to her what they were offering.

12

position and felt that she should accept it and she did not

13

understand that until up to that time and was very dismayed

14

about it, felt that she was being put in the position of

15

"If you agree to this, you can avoid having your deposition

16

taken."

17

This is t h e — I suppose the

He had changed his

Now, you and I would not fear having our deposition

18

taken.

Mrs. Brown had not, I believe, had her deposition

19

ever taken before, was afraid of it, did not understand what

20

it exactly entailed, apparently, and in the face of having

21

spent a lot of time with Mr. Liapis, acquiescing somewhat

22

in the face of authority figure to her, being very dismayed,

23

being very confused, not knowing what to do, then proceeded

24

into a room where this deposition was reported.

25

pages in length.

I have read it carefully.
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1

speaks on the record.

2

the record.

3

Carol Brown, my client, speak on the record.

4

would be that she did not understand the agreement.

5

wasn't in agreement with it.

6

ambushed on the day of the deposition.

7

time, had her attorney advising her that she had to do it

8

under the pain of having her deposition taking, which she

9

didn't understand and she was not in agreement with it and

10
11

The defendant, Mr. Brown, speaks on

Paul Liapis speaks on the record.

Never does
Her testimony
She

She felt bushwhacked and
She, for the first

said nothing about it on the record.
Mr. Dart argues that my client has taken the

12 benefit of the two hundred dollar increase for ten months
13 now and acquiesced and benefited from the stipulation v/hile
14 she seeks to get out of it.
15 simply this:
16

The facts surrounding that are

Mrs. Brown would testify that after having

left Mr. Dart's office, it was her understanding that Mr.

17 Liapis would be preparing a stipulation, turns out that it
18 was agreed that Mr. Dart would prepare it.

Mr. Dart sent a

19 written stipulation, which I have also read and which does
20

fairly reflect that which was taken down at the deposition,

21

to Mr. Liapis and asked him to have his client sign it.

22

Mrs. Brown was not contacted by Mr. Liapis until tv/o and a

23 half months after the deposition—was the first time she was
24

ever notified that he had produced a written document of

25

what purported to be the stipulation and that she was to

8
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1

sign it.

When she got notice that he had it, it was because

2

he sent her a letter with the copy which she immediately

3

read and was dismayed to see what it said and tried to make

4

an appointment to see Mr. Liapis to discuss it.

5

testimony would further be for the first time she tried to

6

get in to discuss it she was told she wouldn't get an

7

appointment for three weeks.

8

went to go to the appointment three weeks later, she was

9

told when she got there that they had been trying to get

Ker

The next time she w e n t — s h e

10 ahold of her not to come because Mr. Liapis was out of town.
11

There was approximately another month or more delays in

12 getting together with Mr. Liapis.

So you are now three and

13 a half months from the deposition date when she finally got
14 to him with a written copy and discussed it and said she
15 felt the terms were very unfair and unreasonable.

I will

16 indicate to the Court in a moment what the terms a r e — i s
17 when the dispute arose between them.

She would not sign.

18 He did not want to continue to represent her.
19

THE COURT:

Wasn't she present when the terms of

20 the stipulation were stated for the record?
21

MR. McPHIE:

She was.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. McPHIE:

24

THE COURT:

25 why not?

Did she feel intimidated to the point she felt

Did she recant or object at that time?
She said nothing.
Well, I suppose what we ought to d o —

9
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1
2

she could not object at that time?
MR. McPHIE:

I believe she dido

Then is when

3

Mr. Liapis withdrew as counsel and that was the first

4

notice that Mr. Dart had really that the stipulation would

5

never be signed, but you are now talking four months since

6

the stipulation was entered into on the record, and in

7

fairness to Mr. Dart, he didn't know for four months-

8

k n e w — I should say he had reason to suspect when he didn't

9

get a signed stipulation from counsel.

He

Since that time it

10

is true she's taken the additional two hundred dollars and

11

frankly she's asked if she should continue to take that,

12

and that's eighteen hundred dollars moved up to two thousand

13

dollars, and she may have been advised to hang on to that

14

money because the result of this was not yet clear.

15

filed a request for additional discovery.

16

Dart then discovered that certainly we were not intending

17

to sign the stipulation and he made this motion to confirm

18

the stipulation which was previously taken on June 5th, as

19

per order of the Court.

20

We

Obviously, Mr.

We seek now to avoid that, after two years time
i

21

and many many thousands of dollars on both sides and being

J

22

nearly ready for trial to simply try the case, and there 1 s

i

23

a case, Your Honor, cited by the Utah Supreme Court in

24

Mr. Dart already has a copy and, in fact, nay have a copy

25

in the file already because I believe Mr. Dart submitted

1975—j

10
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1 a copy of this case when it was argued before the
2

Commissioner—it's a divorce case.

The facts are not

3 exactly the same but the Supreme Court of the State managed
4

to articulate, in Kline, a number of points of law

5 surrounding stipulations, especially in domestic cases. I
6 think that some of the things that are pointed out in the
7 Kline case are the differences between stipulation of facts
8 and stipulations to outcome in a domestic case, which is
9 essentially equitable in its nature.

The difference between

10 whether you should let a person out of a stipulation in a
11 domestic matter based on reasonable reliance of the party
12 who has relied on the stipulation and timeliness.

It makes

13 distinctions in terms of whether the Court thinks that a
14 stipulation is fair.

One of the things that I discover in

15 this work of domestic work, the Court is not bound by the
16 stipulation in domestic cases.
17 can enter different rulings.

He can take them as advisory,

We see that where a wife

18 wants to take too little child support or where parties want
19 to have joint custody of the children and the Court simply
20 won't approve.
21

Let me just address those for a second.

This is

22 a stipulation totally with regard to outcome, not a single
23 fact is stipulated to.

There was no information in this

24 about the income of Dr. Brown, whether it did increase or
25 whether it didn't increase.

With regard to him having relied

11
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1

to his detriment, it is true he has paid according to the

2

stipulation that was entered into ever since July of 1984,

3

but he's known since some time in the late fall of '84 that

4

that was not accepted by Mrs- Brown, yet he's chosen to

5

continue it.

6

day past conduct and in the course of dealing and it f s an

7

insignificant amount to Dr. Brown.

8

dollars moved up to two thousand dollars.

9

explained the terms of the stipulation.

Why?

Well, he would like to be able to argue

It's eighteen hundred
Mr. Dart has
Mr. Brown formerly

10

had in the divorce decree nine hundred dollars alimony,

11

nine hundred dollars child support.

12

that her alimony decrease immediately four hundred dollars

13

and drop off completely to zero in another two years*

14

it does provide for an increase of two hundred dollars per

15

child in child support.

16

alimony goes down four, and she ends up with two hundred

17

dollars a month increase but in two years she ends up with

18

a four hundred dollars a month decrease.

19

outcome for Mrs. Brown, in the face of the discovery that

20

was already in the file when the stipulation was taken or

21

recorded, I don't know what a bad outcome would be.

22

The stipulation provides

But

Child support goes up six and

If that f s a good

The documentary evidence is that Dr. Brown's

23

income has gone somewhere between fifty and sixty thousand

24

dollars at the time of the decree to up between ninety and

25

a hundred thousand dollars at present.

That's not including

12
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money he pays into a pension and profit-sharing plan that

2

would kick it up over a hundred thousand dollars.

3

came out behind it wasn't a good deal.

4

is binding in the case of equity upon this Court.

5

If she

I don't think this

With regard to the argument that she wasn't

6

timely, it was four months before she could even get

7

together with Mr. Liapis and find out what the stipulation

8

that had been sent to her w a s .

9

drew, which was as soon as she could talk to him, that she

She knew as soon as he with-

10

didn't want to be bound by that, that she didn't agree to

11

it.

12

the money, additional monies, the Kline case clearly states

13

it is within the discretion of the Court to relieve either

14

of the parties of a domestic matter where just cause exists.

15

I don't think he's relied to his detriment, certainly an

16

adjustment can be made at the time of trial.

17

to make an adjustment if this case is tried that will make

18

up to the two hundred dollars a month he has sent by simply

19

reducing it, will reduce in his favor.

20

obligated to pay more.

21

be timely.

22

of a massive increase by Dr. Brown gives her less money

23

overall, that's the reverse of what she went to counsel for,

24

not a good deal for her, not fundamentally fair.

25

She thought she had been bushwhacked and if they sent

It's not hard

We think he will be

She was timely within her power to

I think that it's unfair because if in the face

What it boils down to in my opinion is whether or
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1

not in a domestic case where the parties are getting

2

together for the purpose of stipulating to outcome, where

3

this woman is going to get stuck with an agreement pre-made

4

between her attorney which she never understood or agreed

5 J to, now, you can say she was there and she heard.,

All I

6

can say to you is having had many divorce clients try to

7

recite back to me what they just agreed to in domestic

8

matters and not having them even come close, I can tell you

9

that it is very easy to misunderstand for a layman.

It is

10 very easy to misunderstand your attorney telling you what
11

proposed offer and what your own attorney tells you what he

12 thinks you should accept.

j

She didn't understand when you are!

13 in a case where a great deal of discovery has been done,

|

14 there is almost nothing left to do and she simply should

;

15 have the trial on the merits at this point.
16

As a back-up position, let me argue this.

The

17 stipulation should have some value but it shouldn't have the
18 value of her being held to it right now.

Let them put it

19 on at the time of trial, the evidence of what she was
20 willing to agree to on July 5, but if that is taken along
21

with the evidence that I would be able to present about

22

Dr. Brown's income and if the Court takes the stipulation

23

for what it is worth in comparison with all the other evi-

24

dence, I am not afraid of the outcome.

25

that she is stuck with that, under the circumstances, I think

But to simply order

14
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if
1

we have shown some just cause and/the Supremo Court said

2

she could be believed from that, I think it simply is

3

setting us up to have another petition to modify and putting

4

her off for another period of time so that she can come

5

back and claim some change of circumstances,

6

close to the final outcome to waste everything that's been

7

done because of what was said in the stipulation.

8
9

MR. DART:

We are too

Very briefly, it needs to be kept in

mind that the settlement was reached in circumstances where

10

there was an August trial date, where there was a petition

11

for termination of alimony at that time, where the plaintiff

12

in this action has a college degree, had a teaching

13

certificate at one time, has a real estate license, where

14

the children at the time of the divorce were from three to

15

n i n e — b y the time of the trial last August would be between

16

fourteen and eight and that the exposure of termination of

17

alimony while she was receiving counsel with Paul Liapis

18

bargained for a two-year alimony award and two hundred

19

dollars step up, she came into the deposition afraid of the

20

deposition and for the first time, in her language, that

21

it completely amazed and bedazzled her, that it wasn't

22

until she got the stipulation two months later, she didn't

23

understand until then.

We wrote a letter to Mr- Liapis

24 I setting down all the issues and our position on all the
25

issues.

Mr. Liapis sent us a four-page reply letter dated

15
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1

May 10 talking about termination of alimony and a time

2

frame concerning alimony and support, visitation rights.

3

A copy of that letter was sent to Carol Brown on the 10th

4

of May.

5

some final adjustments.

6

apparently in the possession of the plaintiff before the

7

time of this deposition.

8

of the deposition, I think she had a duty to respond a

9

little quicker than she did.

Then sent another letter on the 30th of May with
Those letters were in the file and

If she was surprised at the time

She knew what had been said.

10

She could have contacted her attorney and let her know of

11

her reservation by phone, letter or some manner.

12

did do that.

13

November saying, "Where are we on the stipulation?"

14

only after that that I received his withdrawal.

15

case does i n d i c a t e — M r . McPhie is correct this is an area

16

where the Court has substantial discretion.

17

the Court's discretion to accept the stipulation and enforce

18

it or set it aside.

19

unconscionable stipulation, there is a situation that is in

20

the interest of justice that it be enforced unless there is

21

a justification for avoiding it.

22

case, if there's any justification in law or equity for

23

avoiding or repudiating a stipulation and he timely does so,

24

he's entitled to be relieved from it, otherwise not.

25

have ten months of receipt of benefit, five months with not

She never

My last letter to Paul was the 2nd of
It was

The Kline

It is within

But in circumstances if this is not an

As they say in the Kline

Ue
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1

a word.

2

circumstances, there should be an estoppel.

3
4

We have had the loss of a trial date.

THE COURT:
me.

5 I

Let me read this case.

Under the

Thank you.
It is new to

I will have you a ruling within a day or two.
MR. DART:

Thank you.
* *
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